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FOCUSED DISCUSSION INVITED PAPER
Conceptual Sea Changes∗
Paul Humphreys†
The reshaping of much scientific research around computational
methods is not just a technological curiosity. It results in a
significant reshaping of conceptual and representational resources
within science in ways with which many traditional philosophical
positions are ill-equipped to cope. Some illustrations of this are
provided and a consequence for the roles of science and the arts
is noted.
One of the ironies of academic life is the persistent view that
creative work is largely confined to literature and the fine arts. Kuhn’s
interdisciplinary hit, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, reinforced this
prejudice, but despite the promise of its title, it presents the overwhelming
bulk of work in normal science as profoundly conservative, a feature noted
by Anouk Barberousse and Cyrille Imbert (2010). Perhaps this explains
why professors of English hold the book in such high regard. There is
little doubt that different personality types are drawn to science and the
arts, yet if one looks moderately carefully at the historical development of
the two domains, the conventional view that science is largely pursued by
dullards and that the representational arts swarm with dashing innovators
is seriously wrong.
One reason for the adventurous spirit prevalent in much scientific
research is the fact that the world forces us to expand our conceptual
resources beyond those that are innate or are learned through exposure
to everyday life. In order to effectively deal with aspects of the world
that lie beyond our biologically evolved conceptual frameworks, new
representations are needed whether we pursue prediction, truth-seeking
activities, engineering, or many of the other activities loosely associated
with science. In contrast, literature is largely constrained by the need
to remain in contact with specifically human concerns, with the possible
exception of science fiction which all too often remains attached to
anthropomorphic forms of life. The arts, almost without exception, are
tethered to the human senses, whether visual, acoustic, tactile, olfactory,
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or gustatory. In saying this, I do not deny that artists have invented
ingenious modes of representation. But a painter or a composer who used
media that humans could not hear or see (and by this I do not mean
periods of silence or a blank canvas) would have only a limited career
as a composer of canine music or ultra-violet paintings for bees.1
These pressures for conceptual change have often, although not
exclusively, come from the use of scientific instruments. To be a scientific
realist is to reject an anthropocentric position on what exists. In particular,
it is to recognize that the human senses are simply five detectors with
limited domains of application. The empiricism/realism controversy would
not have been an issue for the philosophy of science, but would have
remained as a metaphysical dispute, had it not been for the invention of,
first the microscope, and then shortly thereafter, the telescope. Even these
first instruments presented phenomena, such as micro-organisms, that
could not be effectively or accurately described using only the concepts
of then-current scientific theories.
Many items usually thought of as experimental apparatuses use
instruments for detection and representation. For example, although it
is usually, and appropriately, known as “the two slit experiment,” the
apparatus used involves an instrument for detecting interference patterns
produced by diffraction and it was the patterns produced by that instrument
which forced theoreticians to come to terms with some distinctively
quantum mechanical concepts. Nor are fancy instruments required for us
to see the need for novel concepts. Statistics is full of novel but graspable
concepts such as heteroscedasticity (the variance of a sequence of
random variables changes over time) and autoregression. There are
loose informal analogs of these measures, but the precise definitions
conceptually outrun their informal cousins and are necessary for an
adequate representation of many stochastic processes. Sometimes the
conceptual breakthrough comes from the development of a new form of
argument: witness the spectacular refinement of our understanding of
forms of infinity after Cantor’s invention of the diagonalization argument
and the subsequent development of systematic theories of infinity within
set theory.
In Extending Ourselves (Humphreys 2004), I suggested that the next
era of science will have to address the challenges posed by using
these instruments, including computational instruments, to allow humans
to grasp radically different ways of representing the world. Traditional
empiricist, Wittgensteinian, and neo-Kantian positions are impediments
to this enterprise; instead of focusing on the limits of our perceptual and
1 On the latter, see Chittka and Walker (2005).
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representational abilities, we need to explore ways of enhancing them.
It helps that the second two of those philosophical positions shifted the
constraining frameworks from the psychological to the linguistic or the
theoretical, but those constraints are neither permanent nor impermeable.
Much has been made of the emergence of language as a source of human
superiority and cultural evolution. Yet natural languages, as opposed
to artificial representational systems, have become a hindrance, not an
advantage. Now that the high water mark of linguistic determinism is
behind us–although there is a continuing division of positions on the extent
to which the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is correct, there is plenty of evidence
that its domain of validity is at best small–ways forward from methods of
conceptual analysis grounded in familiar concepts and based on a priori
methods need to be developed.2
How best, then, to expand the barriers posed by current human
conceptual frameworks? There are two options: expanding human
frameworks and off-loading some or most of the representational work
to artificial cognizers. In both cases, it is helpful to stop thinking in
terms of the usual linguistic frameworks and to think of the issues
in terms of alternatives. In the case of expanding human frameworks,
there is evidence that the plasticity of the human brain can result in
a shifting of psychological capacities. Neural net models of cognitive
capacities make this plausible, especially if one is convinced by arguments
that sub-conceptual representations play a role in cognitive processing.
The existence of this plasticity means that the human conceptual and
“biological” frameworks are not fixed.3 We also have evidence of this
adaptability from haptic technology that allows tactile sensing of properties
that are not inherently touchable, such as the transformation of visual
information into tactile information and, in a virtual reality setting, the ability
to “touch” molecular orbitals.
What is needed is to develop an objective–not a third
person!–conceptual framework to capture the contents of these
newly accessible domains. Consider how thoroughly infused with
anthropocentric perspectives are most philosophical discussions of
related topics. Thomas Nagel’s famous argument for the inadequacy
of linguistic and other scientific approaches to capture what it is like
to be an experiencing agent makes a persuasive case for considering
the role of human and other qualia in a complete account of cognition,
2 On neo-Whorfian positions, see January and Kako (2001) and Fuhrman and Boroditsky
(2010).
3 The existence of cultural universals is not at odds with this potential to reshape concepts
because those universals were all developed in natural environments.
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but until there is evidence that scientific instruments and computational
devices have qualia-like contents, what it is like to be a supercomputer
simulating the formation of planetary systems will require a new objective
conceptual apparatus specifying from the internal perspective of the
computer how the formation is to be represented. Quine’s pervasively
influential arguments against reductive empiricism in his “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism” used statements of sensory experience as forming the outer
boundary of the epistemological web.4 With outputs from instruments
replacing many of these observation statements as more reliable sources
of knowledge, perhaps taken as direct, non-conceptual content, perhaps
reformulated in a new mathematical or computational vocabulary, revision
of the web’s interior to preserve the boundary takes on a distinctively
different cast. Related arguments that cast doubt on the a priori/a
posteriori division also assume, as do most discussions of the a priori
itself, that independence from experience means independence from
human experience.5 Discussions of computational mathematics have
redressed this problem to a limited extent, but much more needs to be
done. We long ago conceded that human pattern recognition abilities are
sufficiently fallible that the results of descriptive statistics and objective
tests for randomness, however counter-intuitive, should prevail and there
is already a considerable literature on sub-conceptual representations
that can usefully be brought to bear on these issues.6
One of the main priorities is to think about problems and solution
methods in terms of conceptualizing them from the machine’s perspective
rather than from the human perspective. The traditional roles of
theories have been prediction (which subsumes solvability), explanation,
understanding, and representation. Once one thinks from a machine point
of view, understanding seems to be inapplicable and the elements of
explanation that remain after the role of providing understanding has been
removed seem to convert to pragmatic virtues rather than epistemic. For
example, providing a unifying representational framework may provide
some gains in efficiency of information storage and prediction, although
it cannot be an overriding desideratum.7 I leave it as an exercise for the
reader as to which of the causal, pragmatic, and inferential-nomological
accounts of explanation make sense from a machine perspective.
4 I am not hereby endorsing Quine’s arguments, which are less than fully persuasive.
5 For recent discussions of the a priori, see Boghossian and Peacocke (2000).
6 For a survey, see Gärdenfors (1997).
7 For reasons why theoretical unification can be counter-productive see Humphreys
(1993).
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